Footnotes #15
The valid, and I believe sound, argument to show that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will is as follows:
1. It has always been true that I will sin tomorrow. (***umption: Omnitemporality of Truth).
2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any truth (***umption: Infallible Foreknowledge).
3. God has always believed that I will sin tomorrow (from 1 and 2).
4. If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone's power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing (***umption: Fixed Past).
5. It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow (from 3 and 4).
6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow (necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness).
7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow (from 5 and 6).
8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning (***umption libertarian free will).
9. Therefore, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow (from 7 and 8).
http://publications.maxwellins***ute...439&index=9ess